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I. INTRODUCTION
Disputes over intellectual property are often fierce and have earned some
corporations the reputation of being trademark bullies, a nickname that carries
with it images of a deep-pocketed, faceless corporation stamping out mom-andpop style shops. The images accompanying this label are not surprising, as the
term "trademark bully" strongly implies some impropriety on behalf of the
corporation.' However, not all large corporations act improperly when they
attempt to protect their intellectual property. The problem lies with the
corporations that incorrectly assert that their property rights extend beyond the
limits of the Lanham Act, the legislation that contains the federal statutes of
trademark law in the United States.2
In a fight that is reminiscent of a schoolyard showdown between the classic
bully and his easy target, Matt Nadeau and his local craft brewery, Rock Art
Brewery, were pitted against Monster Energy Drink. The energy drink
company, Hansen Natural Corporation, sold and distributed its Monster Energy
Drinks through a partnership agreement with Anheuser-Busch. 3 Hansen
Natural had $603.8 million in net sales for the first six months of 20104 and a
market capitalization of $7.4 billion as of September 2011.5 Meanwhile, Rock
Art Brewery was housed in Morrisville, Vermont and had modest beginnings. 6
Nadeau and his wife started brewing beer in the basement of their home in
1997.7 They now have nine employees working in a plant of 10,000 square feet
and produce about 3,500 barrels of beer annually.8 Rock Art sells most of its
beverages in Vermont, both in bottles and in kegs.9 Outside of Vermont, Rock

I Olivera Medenica, Protision of New Act Addresses Trademark Bullies'; Calls for Study on how
Litigation Tactics to Enforce Rights Unreasonab May Harm Small Businesses, 32 NAT'L L.J. No. 36, at 18
(May 17, 2010).
2 Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1141 (2006); Medenica, supra note 1, at 18.
3 Press Release, Hansen Natural Corp. and Anheuser-Busch Announce On-Premise Sales and
Distribution Deal (Feb. 9, 2007), http://investors.hansens.com/releasedetail.cfm?ReleaselD=239
219.
4 Press Release, Hansen Natural Corp., Hansen Natural Reports Record 2010 Second Quarter
FinancialResults (Aug. 5, 2010), http://investors.hansens.com/releasedetail.cfm?ReleaselD=4969
92.
s Hansen Natural Corp., http://money.cnn.com/quote/profile/profile.htl?symb=HANS
(last visited Oct. 2, 2011).
6 Rock Art Brewery, Photos, http://www.rockartbrewery.com/MILESTONES.html (last
visited Oct. 2, 2011).
7 Lisa McCormack, The Art of the Brew, STOWETODAYCOM, June 23, 2011, http://www.stowet
oday.com/this-week/features/article-bdbb9c5e-9cf3-1 1e0-a071-001cc4c03286.html.
8 Art Edelstein, Trademark Bill Would Hep Companies like Vermont's Rock Art Brewey, VT. Bus.
MAG., Jan. 29, 2010, http://www.vermontbiz.com/news/january/trademark-bill-would-help-co
mpanies-vermonts-rock-art-brewery.
9 Art Edelstein, The Vermonster Wins in Battk with Monster, VT. Bus. MAG., Feb. 12, 2010,
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Art expanded into other markets including Arizona, Connecticut, and New
Jersey.1o In 2007, Nadeau decided to brew a special beer to celebrate the
company's tenth anniversary." He described it as "an American style barley
wine with a big, hoppy, fully flavored complex that was 10 percent alcohol."12
After registering the name "Vermonster" as a trademark in the state of
Vermont, 3 Nadeau successfully registered "The Vermonster" as a federal
trademark in the summer.14
The brewery received a cease and desist letter from the international
beverage company, Hansen Natural. 5 At the center of the dispute was the
name of Rock Art's celebratory beer, "The Vermonster." 6 Because of the
similarity in the names "Monster" and "The Vermonster," Nadeau's small
company was pitted against an industry giant and was forced to respond in
order to protect his company.
In its cease and desist letter, Hansen argued that the use of
"VERMONSTER in connection with beer [would] undoubtedly create a
likelihood of confusion and/or dilute the distinctive quality of Hansen's
MONSTER marks."' 7 Rock Art contended that confusion was unlikely
because Hansen did not make alcoholic drinks and the products' packaging
were dissimilar. 8 In addition to warning about potential confusion and
demanding that Nadeau stop using the name "Vermonster," it also asked that
Nadeau pay for legal expenses incurred in connection with the trademark
infringement matter.'9 Although Nadeau's lawyer felt the name was properly
used and the federal government legitimately registered the trademark, he
further explained that a large company like Hansen could prolong litigation to

http://www.vermontbiz.com/article/february/vermonster-wins-batde-monster.
10 Id.
11 Id.
12 Id.;

see also Matt Nadeau, Malt and 'The Monster": Rock Art Brewery vs. Monster Energy
Drink, YouTUBE, http://www.youtube.com/watchV=kbG-woqXTeg (last visited July 14,
2011).
13 VERMONSTER, Vermont File No. 0008350.
14 THE VERMONSTER, U.S.P.T.O. Registration No. 3,742,265, available at http://tess2.uspto.
gov/bin/showfield?f=doc&state=4004:6cfo4a.2.1 (last visited Oct. 2, 2011).
15 Letter from Diane M. Reed, Counsel to Hansen Natural Corp., Knobbe Martens Olson &
Bear LLP, to Christopher J. Day, Counsel to Rock Art Brewery (Sept. 4, 2009), http://www.gree
nmountaindaily.com/upload/caoimhin/Bad%2Faith%2Extortion%/2OLtr.pdf.
16 Id. at 2.
17

Id.

18 Medenica, supra note 1, at 18.
19 Letter from Diane M. Reed to Christopher J. Day, supra note 15, at 2.
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be long enough to bankrupt Nadeau. 20 Nadeau was advised that, in the end, he
21
would likely have to change the beer's name.
Rather than allow Hansen to bully him, Nadeau fought back and contacted
his client base to inform them of Hansen's actions. 22 In response, one of the
state's largest beverage centers, Beverage Warehouse, protested Hansen's
actions by pulling all Hansen products off the shelves. 23 Additionally, at the
peak of the controversy, Nadeau gained over 18,000 supporters through social
networking sites he used to promote his cause. 24 Largely due to the public
support for Rock Art, Hansen settled within twenty-one days and allowed
Nadeau to continue using the name "The Vermonster" as long as he did not
make energy drinks. 25
Fortunately for Nadeau and Rock Art Brewery, they were able to garner
support and draw in enough media scrutiny to counterbalance Hansen's deep
pockets.26 Stories of small businesses being harassed by larger companies are
not rare, but they usually go unnoticed. While certain areas of trademark law
make it easy for large companies to bully smaller companies, stories where the
little guy wins are few and far between. However, this type of overly aggressive
behavior on the behalf of large corporations has been noticed and the small
businesses' often grassroots supporters have caught the attention of Congress.
The Trademark Technical Conforming Amendment Act of 2010 was signed
into law on March 17, 2010.27 The Act made technical changes to the Lanham
Act, but it mainly "harmonize[d] filing procedures between trademarks filed in
the United States directly and those filed abroad pursuant to the Madrid
Protocol." 28
Another provision included in the TI'CA Act, quite different in nature, was
added to the legislation. 29 According to this provision, the Secretary of
Commerce, along with the Intellectual Property Enforcement Coordinator,
must report to the House and Senate Judiciary Committees on "the extent to

Edelstein, supra note 8.
Nadeau, supra note 12.
22 Edelstein, supra note 8.
23 Id.
24 Vermonters and Craft Beer Drinkers Against Monster, FACEBOOK, http://www.facebook.
com/group.php?gid= 171894902802 (last visited Oct. 2, 2011).
25 Edelstein, supra note 8.
26 Associated Press, EneVg Drink Maker Tells Vt. Brewer No "Vermonster" Beer, Bos. HERALD
(Oct. 12, 2009), http://news.bostonherald.com/business/media/view.bg?&articleid=1204122&f
ormat=&page= 1&listingType=media.
27 Trademark Technical Conforming Amendment Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-146, 124 Stat.
66 [hereinafter TTCA Act].
28 Medenica, supra note 1, at 18.
29 Id.; TTCA Act, supra note 27, § 4.
20
21
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which small businesses may be harmed by litigation tactics by corporations
attempting to enforce trademark rights beyond a reasonable interpretation," and
"the best use of Federal Government services to protect trademarks and
prevent counterfeiting" within one year of the TTCA Act's enactment. 30 This
section has been referred to as the trademark bullies provision.31
The TTCA was created by Senator Leahy of Vermont, who was frustrated
by the trademark dispute happening in his state between Rock Art Brewery and
Hansen. 32 The Vermonster dispute, and the Act created in its wake, illustrates a
familiar situation. Often, a party with deeper pockets and more clout challenges
the authenticity of another party's trademark rights, whether or not the basis for
such challenge has a sound foundation in law.3 3 When both parties involved are
in similar financial situations, a lengthy lawsuit can ensue with relatively few
consequences for either company. But when one party cannot afford the
expense of such a protracted suit, the opportunity for a fair and animated
debate diminishes significantly. For this reason, the label of trademark bully
emerged. However, the presence of two parties with different financial footings
does not necessarily mean one party deserves to be dubbed a trademark bully.
While most people enjoy cheering for the underdog, having a financial
disadvantage does not always mean the law is on one's side.
Although a trademark is technically a property right, the main purpose
behind trademark law is to protect consumers from brand confusion.M The
distinction afforded to famous or well-known trademarks is often essential to a
trademark owner's success and can be lost if comparable marks come to be
associated with the trademark owner's goods or services.35 Although there is no
fixed duty to keep watch over other businesses' use of a mark, if a brand owner
does not take legal action against potential infringers and such use becomes
30

TTCA Act, supra note 27, § 4; Medenica, supra note 1, at 18.

31 Medenica, supra note 1, at 18.
32 Press Release, Patrick Leahy, U.S. Senator for Vt., Leahy to Introduce Bill to Ease Burdens
on Trademark Owners (Jan. 26, 2010), http://leahy.senate.gov/press/press.releases/release/?id
=5d97f2ad-eeO8-4d9d-841c-e3fd4149f899.
33 Compare Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records, Inc., 296 F.3d 894 (9th Cit. 2002) (holding Mattel's
actions were overly aggressive in bringing an action against MCA Records for trademark
infringement associated with a song that satirized the Barbie image and holding there was no
infringement, further advising Mattel "to chill"), with People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals
v. Doughney, 263 F.3d 359 (4th Cit. 2001) (deciding that defendant's use of the domain name
"peta.org" that led to a webpage entitled "People Eating Tasty Animals" impermissibly infringed
on the trademark of the plaintiff, an advocacy group opposed to eating meat, wearing fur, and
conducting research on animals).
34 See Mark P. McKenna, The Normaive Foundadonsof Trademark LaW, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
1839, 1840-44 (2007) (writing that the fundamental principles of trademark law have essentially
been ones of tort: unfair competition and the tort of deception to the consumer).
3s 1-1 GILSON ON TRADEMARKS 5 1.03 (2011).
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sufficiently rampant, the owner's mark will be stripped of its distinctiveness, or,
even worse, the mark could be considered abandoned.36 Once a mark is widely
used by other companies, the public will no longer relate the mark to a single
business because of the crowd of analogous marks flooding the marketplace.
The TECA Act has sharply brought into focus the competing needs of
protecting legitimate intellectual property rights and encouraging the growth of
small businesses.
By using recent cases filed by large corporations against smaller local
businesses, this Note will explore the costs and benefits of imposing a higher
bar on trademark infringement claims filed by large corporations against smaller
companies. In proposing a solution, this Note will examine whether the
intellectual property heavyweights traditionally come out ahead in trademark
enforcement actions by looking at key cases throughout the development of
this problem. This Note will also survey the rationales supporting both sides in
the trademark bullying cases: whether over-enforcement of trademark rights has
a deleterious effect on free speech and a dynamic public domain, or whether
corporations are simply aggressively protecting their interest in their trademark,
and, if so, whether this type of enforcement should be allowed.
Because many trademark disputes often settle and do not result in a full jury
trial, this Note will primarily consider doctrinal developments in the law that
affect free speech. Therefore, this Note will not consider relatively informal
practices such as demand letter negotiations. Because these tactics typically
occur out of public view, they are difficult to track and it is difficult to
determine what effects these letters might have on the market.
Part II of this Note will discuss the foundations of trademark law and the
purpose behind allowing a particular manufacturer's or seller's product to be
distinguished from another's parallel product. It will also delve into the case
law in different states and evaluate the level of protection offered. Part III will
analyze the economic and free speech consequences of these cases on the
marketplace. Part IV will conclude that in light of the lowered bar for large
corporations to pursue unreasonable enforcement claims, the study called for
by the TECA Act will plainly show that legislation is necessary to once again
raise that bar.

36

Id
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II. BACKGROUND
A. COMMON LAW ROOTS

Unlike copyrights or patents,37 trademark rights are not rooted in the
Constitution.38 Rather, trademark protection evolved from common law.39
This type of protection originated in 1584, when an English court found a
defendant liable for counterfeiting another's mark and placing it on his own
goods.4 As time passed, courts dubbed this behavior as "passing off," and
placed it under the umbrella of the tort law of fraud and deceit.4' However, by
1850, the common law of trademark protection had grown to have more
similarities with unfair competition law than with tort law.42
With these common law roots as a foundation, Congress enacted the first
federal law of trademark protection in 1870 but the Supreme Court later
invalidated this law.43 Congress attempted to revisit the issue in 1905, but the
law it created in its place only provided limited protection.44 Hence, it was not
until the passage of the Lanham Act in 1946 that modem federal protection for
trademarks came into existence. 45
B. LANHAM ACT

The federal trademark law of the United States is the Lanham Act, 46 which is
now over sixty years old. The Lanham Act defines a trademark as "any word,
name, symbol, or device, or any combination thereof [used in commerce] ... to
identify and distinguish [one's] goods, including a unique product, from those
manufactured or sold by others and to indicate the source of the goods, even if

37 See U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (authorizing Congress to award exclusive rights for a limited
time to authors and inventors for "their respective Writings and Discoveries").
38 See id.; In re Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82, 94-95 (1879) (noting that the power of Congress
to regulate trademarks cannot derive from the Constitution, as a trademark's function differs
from that of a copyright or patent).
39 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION 5 2:7 (4th
ed. 2005) [hereinafter MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS] (citing S. Rep. No. 1333 (1946), as reprintedin
1946 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1275).
4 Id. 5 5:2.
41 Id.
42 Id

43 15 U.S.C. § 81 (repealed July 5, 1946). Congress first enacted a trademark law in 1870, but
that law was invalidated by the Supreme Court in In tr Trade-Mark Cases. 100 U.S. 82 (1879).
44 MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS, supra note 39, § 5:2.
45 15 U.S.C. 5 1051 (2006).
46 Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. 5§ 1051-1141 (2006).
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that source is unknown." 47 A trademark can be anything as long as it signals to
consumers the specific product's origin.48 For example, a trademark may be a
word,49 sound,50 symbol,5' smell, 52 or color. 53 "The primary and proper function
of a trademark is to identify the origin or ownership of the article [or service] to
which it is affixed." 54 This recognition by the public is how trademarks derive
value.55
Trademark holders should monitor their trademarks, or else risk a court
holding that the trademark owners assented to infringing uses by abandoning
their mark or that the mark now lacks distinctiveness. 56 Thus, when truly
infringing57 conduct is identified, the trademark owner must take corrective
steps. 58 The trademark owner need not sue every business suspected of
infringing on its trademark or send cease and desist letters in response to every
conflicting use.59 Rather, the trademark owner should only do what it can

47 Id. § 1127.
48 See, e.g.,Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 162 (1995) (noting the underlying
principles of trademark law, including the requirements that the mark "identify and distinguish
[the seller's] goods ... from those manufactured or sold by others and to indicate [their] source'.
49 See, e.g., Interstellar Starship Servs. v. Epix, Inc., 304 F.3d 936, 943 n.6 (9th Cir. 2002)
(suggesting that words like "Amazon" for an online bookstore or "Roach Motel" for an insect
trap receive protection).
5o JANE C. GINSBURG, JESSICA LITMAN & MARY L. KEVLIN, TRADEMARK AND UNFAIR
COMPETITION LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 108 (3d ed. 2001) ("Intel recently registered the five

note sequence 'D flat, D flat, G, D flat, A flat' as a trademark for computer hardware.").
51 See, e.g., Polo Fashions, Inc. v. Craftex, Inc., 816 F.2d 145, 145 (4th Cir. 1987) (holding
trademark owner of "an embroidered representation of polo player mounted on horse [could
proceed with a] trademark infringement action under the Lanham Act").
52 See, e.g., In re Clarke, 17 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1238, 1238-39 (T.T.A.B. 1990) (finding applicant
demonstrated that the scent of "high impact, fresh, floral fragrance reminiscent of Plumeria
blossoms" functions as a trademark for her thread and embroidery yarn).
53 See, e.g., Qualitex Co., 514 U.S. at 159 (holding that the green-gold color of a manufacturer's
dry cleaning press pads could be registered as a trademark).
54 Hanover Star Milling Co. v. Metcalf, 240 U.S. 403,412 (1916).
55 See William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, TrademarkLaw. An Economic Perspective, 30 J.L. &
EcoN. 265, 270 (1987) ("The value of a trademark is the saving in search costs made possible by
the information ... that the trademark conveys.").
56 See Wallpaper Mfrs., Ltd. v. Crown Wallcovering Corp., 680 F.2d 755, 766 (C.C.P.A. 1982)
(explaining that when trademark holders fail to sue infringers, they risk losing the significance of
their mark).
57 See KP Permanent Make-Up, Inc. v. Lasting Impression I, Inc., 543 U.S. 111, 111 (2004)
(explaining that infringement is present when there is a likelihood of confusion between two
marks).
MB See Ty Inc. v. Softbelly's, Inc., 353 F.3d 528, 531 (7th Cir. 2003) ("Ty polices the use of
'Beanie(s)' vigorously by filing lawsuits, sending cease and desist letters, and opposing trademark
applications for the word or its cognates.").
s9 See United States Jaycees v. Philadelphia Jaycees, 639 F.2d 134, 139 (3d Cir. 1981) (holding
that a trademark owner is not required to act immediately against every possible infringing use to
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within reason.60 On the other hand, if the trademark holder allowed conflicting
uses to continue for more than a reasonable time period, the trademark owner
may have trouble in later efforts to enforce that trademark. 61 For that reason,
policing the trademark is an indispensable part of trademark preservation. 62
Frequently though, some businesses take their policing too far and engage in
overly aggressive behavior.63 For example, the New York Times ran a front-page
article uncovering illegitimate tactics that Levi Strauss & Co. used while
pursuing trademark litigation to secure more market share. 64 Interestingly, the
article detailed the predatory practices that Levi Strauss & Co. used without
discussing whether it was appropriate to even take those aggressive actions in
the first place.65 In fact, all trademark owners are encouraged to employ this
type of behavior to protect what is (sometimes) rightfully theirs. 66 That is,
nearly all trademark owners use trademark litigation to gain market share by
suing competitors, and in so doing increase the competitor's cost to enter the
market as well as the cost to stay in business. 67

avoid abandonment).
6 See Accurate Merch., Inc. v. Am. Pac., 186 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 197, 200 (S.D.N.Y. 1975)
(holding that a trademark owner must "take reasonable measures to detect and prevent
misleading uses of his trademark by his licensees or suffer cancellation of his federal
registration").
61 Wa//paperMfrs., 680 F.2d at 766 (connecting a trademark holder's failure to enforce his mark
with its subsequent loss of legal significance).
62 Herms Int'l v. Lederer de Paris Fifth Ave., Inc., 219 F.3d 104, 110 (2d Cir. 2000) ("To
establish the defense [to trademark infringement] of abandonment, it is necessary to show either
the owner's intent to abandon the mark, or a course of conduct on the part of the owner causing
the mark to become generic or lose its significance as a mark.").
63 Peter Lattman & Andrew Martin, A Start-Up Takes on Proctor & Gambk Over a Name,
DEARBOOK, Sept. 28, 2011, http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2011/09/28/a-start-up-takes-on-proc
tor-and-gamble-over-a-name/ (describing Proctor & Gamble's cease and desist letter that advised
a small business owner that unless she changed the business's name, it would resort to "lengthy
and expensive measures").
64 Michael Barbaro & Julie Creswell, With a Trademark in Its Pocket, Levi's Turns to Suing Its Rivals,
N.Y. Tiams, Jan. 29, 2007, at Al ("[C]ompetitors say the [trademark infringement] lawsuits are
the last resort of a poor loser, a company that has lost billions in sales, laid off thousands of
workers and flirted with bankruptcy as the denim industry exploded.").
65 Id.
66 See Hutchinson v. Essence Commc'ns, Inc., 769 F. Supp. 541, 569 (S.D.N.Y. 1991)
(explaining that a trademark owner is entitled to engage in aggressive behavior to protect its
mark).
67 See, e.g., Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc., 537 F.2d 4, 7 (2d Cir. 1976)
("A&F has spent large sums of money in advertising and promoting products identified with its
mark 'Safari' and in policing its right in the mark, including the successful conduct of trademark
infringement suits.").
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C. FEDERAL TRADEMARK DILUTION ACT

Although the first anti-dilution laws were passed by individual states, it was
not until 1995 that the federal government incorporated the Federal Trademark
Dilution Act (FTDA) into the Lanham Act.68 Under the FTDA, a trademark
owner had a remedy "against another person's commercial use in commerce of
a mark or trade name, if such use [began] after the mark [had] become famous
and [caused] dilution of the distinctive quality of the mark." 69 The FTDA
expanded the scope of rights granted to famous and distinctive trademarks
under the Lanham Act.70 Dilution differs slightly from traditional trademark
infringement in that there is no need to prove a likelihood of confusion to
protect a mark.71 Instead, all that is required is a showing that the use of a
famous mark by a third party caused dilution of the distinctive quality of the
mark. 72
Following the enactment of the FTDA, a number of courts struggled with
its interpretation. 73 Some of this uncertainty was centered around whether a
mark could be famous when used in niche markets and whether a famous mark
must be either inherently distinctive or distinctive with secondary meaning
through continuous use. 74 Inherently distinctive marks tend to be more
creative, avoiding any actual description of the related goods or services, 75 like
the "Google" mark, which bears no relation to the actual services offered by
Google. If a mark is not inherently distinctive, it can acquire the necessary
distinctiveness through secondary meaning. 76 Secondary meaning shows that
the mark has some meaning to the public beyond the obvious meaning of the
terms or images of the mark itself.77 If the primary significance of the mark to

68 Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-98, 109 Stat. 985, amending the
Trademark Act of 1946 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1125 (1995)).
69 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1) (2006).
70 See Federal Trademark Dilution Act, supra note 68.
71 MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS, supra note 39, § 24:72.
72 Id.
73 See infra notes 74-80.
74 See Savin Corp. v. Savin Grp., 391 F.3d 439, 449 (2d Cir. 2004) (stating that a famous mark
must be inherently distinctive); Sporty's Farm L.L.C. v. Sportsman's Mkts., Inc., 202 F.3d 489,
497 n.10 (2d Cit. 2000) (discussing the requirement for fame in the general marketplace); Star
Mkts. Ltd. v. Texaco, Inc., 950 F. Supp. 1030, 1034-35 (D. Hawaii 1996) (finding that being
famous in a "niche" market is sufficient); Equine Techs., Inc. v. Equitechnology, Inc., 68 F.3d
542, 546-47 (1st Cit. 1995).
7s Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 768 (1992) (explaining that some marks
are deemed inherently distinctive because "their intrinsic nature serves to identify a particular
source of a product").
76 McCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS, supra note 39, S 15:1.50.
77 Id
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the consuming public has become the source of the goods or services, rather
than the product itself, the mark has acquired secondary meaning.78
Another issue involved trademark dilution, a concept giving the owner of a
famous trademark the ability to forbid others from using that mark in a way
that would lessen its uniqueness. 79 Importantly, appellate courts were split on
the issue of whether a plaintiff had to show actual dilution or a likelihood of
dilution to prevail on a dilution claim after the enactment of the FDTA.80 The
issue was eventually addressed by the Supreme Court in Mosely v. V Secret
Catalogue Inc.81 In Moseley, the plaintiff, the owner of the "Victoria's Secret"
trademark, claimed that the defendant's use of the trademark "Victor's Secret"
for a store selling predominantly adult novelty items caused the dilution of
plaintiffs well-known mark under the FTDA. 82 The Supreme Court reversed
and remanded the district court's decision, finding that trademark owners must
establish actual dilution rather than merely a likelihood of dilution.83 In other
words, a plaintiff would need either objective proof or reliable circumstantial
evidence to prove actual dilution of the plaintiffs mark to prevail under the
FTDA.8
D. TRADEMARK DILUTION REVISION ACT

Following Moseley, Congress held hearings to examine possible revisions to
the FTDA.85 In 2006, President Bush signed into law the Trademark Dilution
Revision Act (TDRA), which made considerable changes to the FTDA.86 The
TDRA expressly overruled Moseley by allowing famous trademark holders to
87
prevail on a dilution claim by showing only a likelihood of confusion.

78 See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Bros., Inc., 529 U.S. 205, 211 (2000) (stating that
secondary meaning is developed when the primary significance of the trademark is to identify the
source of the product rather than the product itself).
79 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1) (2006).
8 Compare Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v. Utah Div. of Travel
Dev., 170 F.3d 449 (4th Cir. 1999), superseded by statute, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1) (2006) (concluding
that the FTDA requires proof of actual dilution), with Nabisco, Inc. v. PF Brands, Inc., 191 F.3d
208 (2d Cir. 1999), abrogated by Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc., 537 U.S. 418 (2003)
(disagreeing with the Fourth Circuit and holding that an action for dilution may be adjudicated
before actual dilution occurred by using a "likelihood of dilution" standard).
81 Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc., 537 U.S. 418 (2003).
82 Id. at 423.
83 Id. at 433-34.
84 Id.
85 Trademark Dilution Revision Act of 2005: Hearing on H.R 683 Before the Subcomm. on Corts, the
Internet,and Intelkctal Properyof the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. (2005).
86 Trademark Dilution Revision Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-312, 120 Stat. 1730.
87 Id
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Specifically, the Act stated that the use of a trademark in connection with the
sale of a good will constitute infringement if it is likely to cause consumer
confusion as to the source of those goods or as to the sponsorship or approval
of such goods.88
For all practical purposes, these changes cleared considerable hurdles for
well-known trademark holders by not requiring actual dilution. The threshold
to reach a famous mark status might have been made higher, but once reached,
the evidentiary burden to prevail on a dilution claim became significantly
lower.89 That is, instead of requiring a famous mark owner to prove actual
dilution, they only have to show a likelihood of dilution to meet their burden.90
This benefited famous trademark holders, but not lesser-known operations like
Vermonster. 91
Although the label of trademark bully can be attached to any overly
aggressive trademark owner, it usually sticks to famous trademark owners. 92
Case law is replete with examples of famous trademark owners asserting
infringement and dilution claims against small business operations.93 The
TDRA gives large companies substantial leverage in keeping small businesses
from using marks that may only marginally resemble the famous mark by
claiming that it has been diluted. 94 The bigger the company, the more famous
the trademark, and therefore the easier it will be under the Act for larger

88 See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1) (revising the FTDA by providing that using a trademark that is
"likely to cause dilution" is enough to create liability under the Lanham Act, making clear that
evidence of actual harm is not required).
89 Candidus Dougherty & Greg Lastowka, Virtual Trademarks, 24 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER &
HIGH TECH. L.J. 749, 793 (2008) (explaining that the Trademark Dilution Revision Act "loosened
a plaintiffs evidentiary burden to a likelihood of dilution standard").
90 Id.
91See, e.g., 152 Cong. Rec. H6965 (daily ed. Sept. 25, 2006) (statement of Rep. David Wu)
(expressing concern that the Act too heavily favored major corporations over small businesses).
92 See Mattel, Inc. v. Walking Mountain Prods., 353 F.3d 792, 796 (9th Cir. 2003) (finding that
the defendant did not infringe on Mattel's trademark by producing photographs that "portray[ed]
a nude 'Barbie' doll in danger of being attacked by vintage household appliances").
93 See, e.g., Entrepreneur Media, Inc. v. Smith, 279 F.3d 1135, 1144-45 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding
a public relations firm's use of mark "Entrepreneur Illustrated" on publication distributed freely
to media members was likely to cause confusion as to publisher's "Entrepreneur" mark for
magazine targeted at small business owners, and thus infringed the "Entrepreneur" mark); Bell v.
Starbucks U.S. Brands Corp., 389 F. Supp. 2d 766, 777 (S.D. Tex. 2005) (holding "Plaintiffs use
of the word 'Starbock,' as presented in Plaintiff's trademark application, and his use of'Star Bock'
in word form without the word 'beer' or any design elements, manifestly infringes Defendants'
mark").
94 See Virgin Enterprises Ltd. v. Nawab, 335 F.3d 141, 150 (2d Cir. 2003) (finding that the
closer the junior company's goods resemble the other trademark user's famous brand, "the more
likely that the consumer will mistakenly assume a common source").
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companies to use their market share against smaller companies. 5 National
companies with highly recognizable marks could have more leverage than any
single small business and could easily outspend those businesses if litigation
arose. 96
E. PURPOSES AND GOALS OF TRADEMARK PROTECTION

Despite what some commentators say,97 there is a general consensus that the
primary purpose of trademark protection is to supply consumers with accurate
information regarding the source of the good.98 Thus, trademarks help
Consumers can seek out specific
diminish consumer search costs.99
information while searching for goods, and then use easily distinguishable and
identifiable trademarks to help decrease the time and resources necessary to
find their desired product.100 Another effect of the public detection aspect of
trademarks is the incentive for producers to increase product quality. 01 Thus, if
trademark law protects the mark's owner from infringement by a competitor,
the owner will invest more money and resources to improve his product's
quality, because consumers will seek out the higher quality product.102 Without
trademark protection, a competitor could easily use another's mark to sell an
inferior product, and take away some of the actual trademark holder's
customers.103 This scenario demonstrates another purpose served by trademark
95 See, e.g., Malletier v. Dooney & Bourke, Inc., 561 F. Supp. 2d 368, 391 (S.D.N.Y. 2008)
(accepting plaintiffs mark as generally famous based on expenditures in advertising).
96 See, e.g., Mike Masnick, TECHDIRT, Feb. 10, 2009, http://techdirt.com/articles/20090210/
0230413713.shtml.
97 See Robert G. Bone, Huning Goodwil: A Histop of the Concept of Goodwill in Trademark Law, 86
B.U. L. REV. 547, 549 (2006) ("It is customary to refer to trademark law as protecting a seller's
goodwill in its mark.").
98 See Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 163-64 (1995) (explaining how a
mark reduces the cost to consumers of making informed shopping decisions); Park 'N Fly, Inc. v.
Dollar Park and Fly, Inc., 469 U.S. 189, 197-98 (1985) (concluding that one purpose of
protecting trademarks is to "protect the ability of consumers to distinguish among competing
producers").

99 See wlLLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAw 167-68 (2003).
100 Id.

OF

101See Quaktex Co., 514 U.S. at 164 (1995) (noting that trademark law " 'encourage[s] the
production of quality products' and simultaneously discourages those who hope to sell inferior
products by capitalizing on a consumer's inability quickly to evaluate the quality of an item
offered for sale" (quoting McCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS, supra note 39, § 2.01)).
102 See Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, 4 Search-Costs Theog ofLimiing Doctrines in Trademark
Law, 97 TRADEMARK REP. 1223, 1225 (2007) (discussing the economic efficiencies created by
trademarks as indicators of quality).
103 See David W. Barnes, Trademark Externaliies,10 YALE J.L. & TECH. 1 (2007) (explaining that
without trademark protection, consumers may mistakenly buy an inferior product and shun the
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protection, which is the prevention of consumer deception stemming from the
use of a confusingly similar mark, and resulting in the purchase of products that
the consumer does not desire."os
A secondary goal of trademark law is the protection of a trademark owner's
goodwill through the manufacture and use of that trademark.105 This purpose
of trademark law makes it different than other types of intellectual property,
such as patents or copyrights.o 6 For patents and copyrights, the protected
intellectual property is the property that actually contains value. 0 7 By contrast,
the value of trademarks comes from their ability to signal to the market the
quality of the good. 08 Therefore, the goal of protecting a trademark holder's
goodwill is not necessarily what trademark protection aims to do, but some
commentators nonetheless endorse it.109 Those who argue for upholding a
trademark holder's goodwill often state that not doing so would encourage free
riding, but free riding may in some cases be a good thing, as it can be a means
of serving public demand.10
The Supreme Court encompassed both of these goals of trademark law in
Qualitex Co. v.Jacobsen Products Co.' In Qualitex, the court stated that trademark
law "reduce[s] the customer's costs of shopping and making purchasing
decisions" because "it quickly and easily assures a potential customer that
the. . . item with [the trademark] ... is made by the same producer as other
2
similarly marked items that he or she liked (or disliked) in the past."11 It
Meanwhile, the law
prevents others from copying a source-identifying mark.'
also helps comfort a producer that it, and not an imitating competitor, will

mark holder's product).
104 Bone, supra note 97, at 555-56.
105 Id. at 549 ("It is customary to refer to trademark law as protecting a seller's goodwill in its
mark ... . There is, however, a serious problem with this proposition. Characterizing trademark
law in terms of goodwill protection ultimately conflicts with the well recognized consumeroriented goals of trademark law.").
106 See McCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS, supra note 39, S 6:3 (comparing the policies behind
patents, trademarks, and copyrights).
107 Id.
108 See LANDES & POSNER, supra note 99, at 168-70.
109 Bone, supranote 97, at 549-50.
110 Wendy J. Gordon, On Owning Information: Intelkectual Properly and the Resituionary Impulse, 78
VA. L. REv. 149, 167 (1992) (asserting that free riding is important because "[a] culture could not
exist if all free riding were prohibited within it").
111Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 159 (1995).
112 Id. at 164 (alteration in original) (quoting MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS, supra note 39,
$ 2:01).
113 Id. at 163.

https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/jipl/vol19/iss1/5

14

Andrzejewski: "Leave Little Guys Alone!": Protecting Small Businesses from Over

2011]1

'LEAVE IITLE GUYS ALONE!"

131

collect the financial and reputation-related rewards associated with a soughtafter product.114
Some scholars argue that there is a third, separate goal of trademark
protection to promote "fair competition." 5 This third goal favors the public
16
market and freedom of expression over the individual trademark holder.'
"This third policy justification, however, may not do much additional work
beyond that already done by the primary purpose," which is to "prevent
customer confusion."" 7
III. ANALYSIS
A. A LOOK AT TRADEMARK DILUTION

As one
Trademark dilution is a relatively modern legal doctrine." 8
commentator, Laura R. Bradford, explained, trademark law conventionally aims
to improve the quality of market information by prohibiting misleading uses of
Prohibiting misleading uses of trademarks improves the
trademarks."19
efficiency of the market because it prevents the consumer from buying the
wrong product.120 Thus, protection for the "informational integrity" of
trademarks allows consumers to spend less time and fewer resources in search
of the desired product, which in turn decreases search costs.121
114 See, e.g., Smith v. Chanel, Inc., 402 F.2d 562, 567 (9th Cir. 1968) ("The primary value of the
modem trademark lies in the 'conditioned reflex developed in the buyer. . . .' To the extent that
advertising of this type succeeds, it is suggested, the trademark is endowed with sales appeal
independent of the quality or price of the product to which it is attached; economically irrational
elements are introduced into consumer choices." (citation omitted)); see also Triangle Publ'ns, Inc.
v. Rohrlich, 167 F.2d 969, 980 n.13 (2d Cir. 1948) (Frank, J., dissenting) ("The trade-name
doctrine enables one to acquire a vested interest in a demand 'spuriously' stimulated through 'the
art of advertising.' "), overrakd ly Mansanto Chem. Co. v. Perfect Fit Prods. Mfg. Co., 349 F.2d
389 (2d Cir. 1965).
115 Jennifer E. Rothman, Initial Interest Confusion: Standing at the Crossroads of Trademark Law, 27
CARDozo L. REV. 105, 127 (2005).
116

Id.

117 Daniel Devoe, Appying Liabily Rules to Metatag Cases and Other Instances of Trademark
Infringement on the Internet: How to Get to 'No Ham, No Fou,"90 B.U. L. REv. 1221, 1238 (2010).
118 Laura R. Bradford, Emotion, Dilution, and the Trademark Consumer, 23 BERKELEY TECH. L.J.
1227, 1231 n.10 (2008) ("The first federal dilution law was passed in 1995. Before this trademark
dilution protection was available on a patchwork basis from state law. The first state anti-dilution
law was passed in 1947 in Massachusetts." (citation omitted)).
119 Id. at 1231 (citing Stacey L. Dogan, What is Dilution Anyway?, 105 MICH. L. REV. FIRST
IMPRESSIONS 103, 106 (2006), http://www.michiganlawreview.org/assets/fi/105/dogan.pdf
("Trademark law has never aimed to provide exclusive rights in marks, but has focused on
preserving informational clarity in the marketplace.")).
120 Id.

121 Id. (citing Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 163-64 (1995)).
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In an effort to limit consumer confusion and economic consequences,
trademark dilution law prohibits "interferences with the uniqueness of a
trademark."1 22 As Bradford explains the concept: "consumers may or may not
think that 'Chevrolet shoes' were made by the car company, but their presence
in the marketplace would diminish or 'dilute' the singularity of the original
Chevrolet mark."1 23 Bradford continues by noting that the goal of these
prohibitions is to prevent "the gradual whittling away or dispersion of the
identity and hold upon the public mind of the mark or name by its use upon
non-competing goods." 24 Finally, Bradford gives examples of contemporary
dilutive uses of famous marks, including the use of the mark "Perfume-bay" for
E-bay, "Nikepal" for Nike, and the name "Hot Rigz" for "Hot Wheels" toy
cars.125
It is clear that most trademark holders find dilution damaging and believe
that dilution harms the value created in their trademark.126 According to
Bradford, supporters of "dilution regulation have linked the dilution cause of
action to the goal of lowering search costs."1 27 They argue that the loose use of
well-known symbols will cause a trademark's meaning and significance to
decline, thus also decreasing a mark's utility as a means for quickly locating
goods.128 Based on this view, "free-riding on the familiarity of well-known
marks increases 'internal search costs', or the amount of mental time and effort
consumers must expend to connect the mark to its original owner and larger
goodwill."1 29
Bradford points out that "critics are skeptical that a few extra seconds of
cogitation, assuming they are required, justifies a race to the federal courthouse

Id
Id
124 Id. (quoting Frank I. Schecter, The RaionalBasisof Trademark Protetion,40 HARV. L. REv.
813,
825 (1927)).
125 Id. See, e.g., Perfumebay.com Inc. v. eBay, Inc., 506 F.3d 1165 (9th Cit. 2007);
Jada Toys,
Inc. v. Mattel, Inc., 518 F.3d 628 (9th Cit. 2008); Nike, Inc. v. Nikepal Int'l, Inc., 84 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1820 (E.D. Cal. 2007).
126 Bradford, supra note 118, at 1231.
127 Id (citing Richard A. Posner, When Is Parody Fair Use?, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 67, 75 (1992) ("A
trademark seeks to economize on information costs by providing a compact, memorable, and
unambiguous identifier of a product or service. The economy is less when, because the
trademark has other associations, a person seeing it must think for a moment before recognizing
it as the mark of the product or service.")).
128 Id. at 1232; see also Amstar Corp. v. Domino's Pizza, Inc., 615 F.2d 252, 265 (5th Cit. 1980)
("Dilution . .. occurs 'where the use of the trademark by the subsequent user will lessen the
uniqueness of the prior user's mark with the possible future result that a strong mark may become
a weak mark.'").
129 Bradford, supra note 118, at 1232.
122
123
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if consumers are not actually confused about who makes a particular good."130
"Famous marks have always existed" in the same market with "lesser-known"
trademarks.131 Bradford considers two market leaders in separate industries as
examples: Ford Motor Company and the Ford Modeling Agency. 132 While it
does not appear that either company is negatively impacted by the other, the
consumer presumably "must spend a certain amount of time or effort to
distinguish them."133 Protecting these and similar trademarks, however, appears
to be in direct conflict with First Amendment values that encourage "criticism
of, discussion about, and comparison with well-known brands."134 Bradford
finds it unsurprising that "courts have found the harm threatened by dilution
'dauntingly elusive' to comprehend; accordingly [the courts] have been reluctant
to enforce the law as written."1 35
"Dilution regulation aims to preserve the signaling value of brand familiarity
for consumers," 136 but it may overstep boundaries and interfere with other
businesses' ability to create marks. Proponents of dilution regulation argue that
because consumer markets suffer from information asymmetries in which
sellers possess better information than buyers, buyers depend on signals from
sellers and other third parties in making purchasing decisions.'37 Essentially, the
basic argument made by those in favor of dilution regulation is that consumers
rely on the familiarity of trademarks as an indicator of a certain quality that has
come to be associated with that particular brand, which helps to reduce risk and
evaluation costs.138

130 Id.; seealso Jacob Jacoby, The Pgchological Foundaions of Trademark Law: Seconday Meaning
Generidsm, Fame, Confusion and Diluion, 91 TRADEMARK REP. 1013, 1047 (2001) (explaining how
consumers will require additional information when confronted with a second comer trademark).
131 Bradford, supra note 118, at 1232-33.
132 Id
133 Id. at 1233 n.19 (citing Transcript of Oral Argument, Moseley v. Victoria's Secret Catalogue,
537 U.S. 418 (2003) 2002 WL 31643067 at *10-11) ("[P]osing the questions whether the two uses
of Ford, and also Delta Airlines, Delta Plumbing and Delta Dental caused the same kind of harm
as dilution.").
134 Id. at 1233; see also Rebecca Tushnet, Gone in Sixty Milliseconds: Trademark Law and Cognitive
Sdence, 86 TEx. L. REv. 507, 550-51 (2008) (discussing the use of the suffix "Mc" from
McDonald's to "indicate convenience, cheapness, uniformity, and other qualities associated with
McDonald's ... [with such] pervasive commumcative uses ... as shorthand for a set of qualities
keeps the mark's meanings from being locked down").
135 Bradford, supra note 118, at 1233 (citing Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows,
Inc. v. Utah Div. of Travel Dev., 170 F.3d 449,451 (4th Cit. 1999)).
136 Id. at 1234-36.
137 Id
138 Id. at 1235.
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B. WHY MOST CASES ARE NOT LITIGATED

As former Chief Justice Warren E. Burger once said, "for many claims, trials
by the adversarial contest must in time go the way of the ancient trial by battle
and blood. Our system is too costly, too painful, too destructive, [and] too
inefficient for a truly civilized people." 39 As such, the small business owner
may feel defeated before even stepping foot into the courthouse when "faced
with uncertainties such as the length of a trial, the amount of discovery
required, the success of winning on the merits and the likelihood of appeal."1 40
Regardless of the relative merits of a small business owner's case, the seemingly
endless resources of his opponent will undoubtedly intimidate him.141 For the
average small business owner, "adequate representation of his claim lies in a
quicker and more cost-effective alternative to litigation."142
In addition to smaller companies, larger corporations may also elect not to
engage in the typical litigation route for many reasons.143 First, the number of
potential infringers is possibly infinite and the list could include both small and
large businesses. Second, larger companies put their reputation on the line and
are often under strict public scrutiny when they file suit against other companies
for trademark infringement in the typical litigation setting.144 As mainstream
media follows high-profile litigation with microscopic precision, a company that
pursues that route risks being called a trademark bully.145 Moreover, even
though only a handful of cases actually make it to the trial stage,146 the endless
cycle of the "filing of'complaints is costly and would still invite the attention of
the media and the public alike."' 47

139 Warren E. Burger, Chief Justice, Supreme Court of the United States, Annual Report on the
State of the Judiciary Speech to the American Bar Ass'n House of Delegates (Feb. 13, 1984), in 52
U.S.L.W. (BNA) 2471 (Feb. 28, 1984).
140 Boris Shapiro, Trademark Arbitradon:A FirstRate Changefor a Second iDfe Future, 8 CHI.-KENT
J. INTELL. PROP. 273, 287 n.53 (2009) (citing in support federal documents stating that federal
court cases take an average of 23.3 months from filing to disposition).
141 Id
142 Id
143 Id
144 Id. at 287-88; see, e.g., My Dough Girlvs. Pillsbuy Corporaion,FACEBOOK, http://www.facebo
ok.com/my.dough.girl.vs.pillsburycorporation (last visited Oct. 2, 2011) (exemplifying the
potential harm to a corporation's reputation through a fan-based shame campaign on Facebook
against General Mills' Pillsbury subsidiary for demanding a locally owned cookie shop called "My
Dough Girl" change the business's name).
145 Ryan McCarthy, Here Come the Trademark Bules, INC., Jan. 1, 2007, http://www.inc.com/ma
gazine/20070101/priority-trademarks.html.
146 55 AM. JUR. Trials S 483 (2008) (reporting that only 3% to 4% of the eighteen million civil
cases filed in state courts each year go to trial).
147 Shapiro, supra note 140, at 288.
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Perhaps the most troubling aspect of the litigation route for any company
"is that the outcome of the litigation is essentially out of their hands."148 First,
all of the normal variables that exist in any jury trial are also present in
trademark infringement suits, including the judge assigned to the case, which lay
people are selected to be members of the jury, and what evidence is admitted or
excluded.14 9 Stakes are exponentially higher in cases involving intellectual
property disputes where the subject matter could potentially be very
technical.150 "This realization is driven home when [the company is] waiting for
the jury to return a verdict or a judge to announce a decision. At that moment,
it is crystal clear the outcome can go either way and [the company] might
lose."1'5
A small business has limited resources to avoid litigation when faced with
possible lawsuits from overly aggressive trademark holders due to unpredictable
litigation outcomes and large legal bills. Large businesses, and even entire
industries, should also respond to these risks conservatively. They should adopt
"trademark rights clearance practices" to avoid the danger of liability, thereby
"institutionalizing an incentive structure contrary to free speech values."1 52 For
example, insurers often insist on rights clearance for every single expressive use
of a trademark in documentaries.153 Also, "reality television producers obscure
4
unlicensed trademark logos captured incidentally in the footage they air." 5
Google also allows trademark holders to "ban the use of their trademarks in
others' advertisements." 55 Finally, the virtual game world Second Life generally
forbids graphical items created by individuals if they incorporate trademarks.156
These policies, which go beyond what the law requires, are designed to remove
even the smallest risk of trademark disputes, and are a cost of the current

148

149

Id
Id.

150 Id
''
152

Ids

William McGeveran, Rethinking Trademark Fair Use, 94 IowA L. REv. 49, 63 (2008).
Id.; see, e.g., Patricia Aufdetheide & Peter Jaszi, Ctr. for Soc. Media, Am. Univ., Untold
Stories: Creative Consequences of the Rights Clearance Culture for Documentary Filmmakers 910 (2004), http://www.centerforsocialmedia.org/fair-use/best-practices/documentary/untold-st
ories-creative-consequences-rights-clearance-culture (last visited Oct. 2, 2011).
154 McGeveran, supra note 152, at 63; see also James Gibson, Risk Aversion and Rigbts Accretion in
Intellectual PropertjLaw, 116 YALE L.J. 882, 913 (2007).
1ss McGeveran, supra note 152, at 63; see also Google, Adwords Trademark Complaint
Procedures, http://adwords.google.com/support/aw (last visited Oct. 2, 2011).
156 McGeveran, supra note 152, at 63 (citing VintFalken.com, Coca-Cola Releases Trademark to
Second Life Merchants, http://www.vintfalken.com/coca-cola-releases-trademark-to-second-lifemerchants/ (last visited Oct. 2, 2011) (describing Coca-Cola's choice to allow Second Life users
to incorporate some trademarked graphics into individual profiles)).
153
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system.157 The extreme caution may be to high of a cost when it censors
"artists or critics who rely on institutional support to disseminate their
speech."158
To protect their intellectual property rights, companies may feel they must
use aggressive tactics because of the uncertainties inherent in pursuing
traditional litigation. A recent study determined that "a continued increase in
the number of trademark cases filed, combined with decreases in the percentage
of cases that reach trial, suggested that [trademark owners] were filing strike
suits aimed at forcing quick or favorable settlements." 5 9 More evasive (and
60
harder to measure) than strike suits are cease and desist letters.1 Trademark
owners often send cease and desist letters even when the use of the mark is
almost certainly legal under current law.161 Such threatening letters, which
usually are printed on formal law firm stationery and contain intimidating legal
jargon, "have been colorfully characterized as 'gorilla chest thumping' and
'trademark extortion.' "162 Most trademark holders send this type of letter as a
63
standard procedure because there is little disadvantage to sending one.1 In
fact, some facets of trademark law force businesses to police their marks in
order to maintain them so that it cannot be said that the marks were

157

Id
Id
159 Id. at 63-64 (citing Kenneth L. Port, Trademark Extorion: The End of Trademark Law, 65
WASH. & LEE L. REv. 585, 589-90 (2008) (discussing how some trademark holders send cease
and desist letters even if the cases "are almost never prosecuted to a conclusion on their merits")).
158

160 Id. at 64.

161 Id. at 64 n.72 (citing Marjorie Heins & Tricia Beckles, Brennan Ctr. for Justice, N.Y. Univ.
Sch. of Law, Will Fair Use Sumive?.- Free Expression in the Age of Copyright Control 35-36 (2005),
(last visited Oct. 2, 2011)
http://www.fepproject.org/policyreports/WillFairUseSurvive.pdf
(discussing an "unscientific study of cease-and-desist letters involving both copyright and
trademark claims [that] found significant degrees of compliance even where the intellectual
property claims were weak or potential defenses were strong")). McGeveran also gives two
examples of clearinghouses that catalogue threats regarding intellectual property rights. Id. (citing
Chilling Effects Clearinghouse, http://www.chillingeffects.org/search.cgi (last visited Oct. 2,
2011); Citizen Media Law Project, Legal Threats Database, http://www.citmedialaw.org/database
(last visited Oct. 2, 2011) (showing the difficulty of conducting a more rigorous study of a
phenomenon that typically goes unreported and unlitigated, but this online database documents
legal threats involving trademarks and other intellectual property matters)).
162 Id at 64 (citing Chilling Effects Clearinghouse Frequently Asked Questions (and Answers)
About Trademark, http://www.chiingeffects.org/trademark/faz.cgi (last visited Oct. 2, 2011);
Port, supra note 162, at 633).
163 McGeveran, supra note 152, at 64 n.75 (citing David V. Radack, NAT'L FED. INDEP. Bus.,
Your Trademark Is Your Business, You Better ProtectIt (Sept. 24, 2003), http://www.nfib.com/busine
ss-resources/business-resources-item?cmsid=16336 (last visited Oct. 2, 2011) ("In the case of an
'innocent' or timid infringer, a letter demanding that the infringement cease and desist may be
enough. This is a relatively cheap alternative to going to court.")).
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abandoned.164 This can lead to overly aggressive behavior, including sending
off frivolous cease and desist letters.' 65
According to another commentator, William McGeveran, one suggestion to
help alleviate this type of bullying is the use of licensing agreements in situations
where the smaller business is likely to win but the larger business has infinitely
more resources. 166 McGeveran notes that there are at least three reasons why
heavily relying on voluntary licensing in these situations would not help the
First, obtaining licenses is often difficult and expensive.168
problem.167
McGeveran contends that there is little or no incentive for large businesses to
even respond to various small business, and thus lower-stakes, licensing
requests.169 He believes that even if for some reason they did engage in
licensing agreements with smaller businesses, "the pricing of the transaction
would reflect both these costs and the [trademark owner's] monopoly
position."170 The sum of all those costs would further discourage the little guy
and greatly diminish the helpfulness of licensing devices, especially for smaller
businesses.
Second, "legally unnecessary trademark licensing produces a feedback effect
that further shrinks the public domain."171 As previously discussed, "trademark
law defines infringement based upon consumer understanding,"1 72 or lack
thereof, in which case it would be consumer confusion.' 73 McGeveran
continues his analysis by stating that "widespread overcautious licensing
fortifies consumers' expectations that such licensing is legally required."174 In
turn, this distorted view of the law "increases the likelihood that consumers will
be confused in the future by an unauthorized expressive use of a mark,

164 3 MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 17:6 (2011) (explaining failure
to police can lead to abandonment).
165 McGeveran, supra note 152, at 64 (citing Deven R. Desai & Sandra L. Rierson, Confronting the
Generiism Conundrum, 28 CARDOzo L. REv. 1789, 1839-40 (2007) (describing the policing
incentive created by fear of a trademark becoming generic)).
166 Id
167 Id.
168 Id
169 Id. at 65.
170 Id
171 Id. at 65 n.78 (citing Port, supra note 159, at 590 (listing various means that the current
trademark owner uses to broaden the trademark's scope and shrink the public domain)).
172 Id. at 65.
173 See AMF Inc. v. Sleekcraft Boats, 599 F.2d 341, 348 (9th Cit. 1979) (stating that when goods
produced by the alleged infringer compete for sales with those of the trademark owner,
infringement usually will be found if the marks are sufficiently similar that confusion can be
expected).
174 McGeveran, supranote 152, at 65.
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rendering even more uses infringing."17 5 McGeveran concludes this second
point by finding that "the chilling effect of unstable fair use protection causes
more problems for trademark law than does the parallel problem in copyright
law, where the definition of rights does not depend on subjective public
understanding."76
The third and most substantial objection raised by McGeveran to relying on
licensing arises when the potential use negatively reflects the trademark. 77
McGeveran cautions that "license requirements give trademark owners vetoes
over criticism and parody of themselves or their products" and therefore only
encourages arrangements that depict trademarks in a positive light. 78 "Truly
consensual agreements to make favorable expressive uses (involving, say, a large
consumer-products [trademark owner] and a Hollywood movie studio) may be
mutually beneficial and perhaps relatively inoffensive to public interests."17 9
McGeveran once more warns that the "pressure to license all uses would
deprive the public of unfettered discourse about products and their makers." 80
Therefore, McGeveran explains that the existing trademark fair use laws
deter unlicensed uses of trademarks or, alternatively, encourage submission on
behalf of the smaller businesses when threatened with legal action.181 This
"intermittent chilling effect has grown into a more widespread expectation of
licensing that influences both individuals and institutions in their approach to
trademarks."1 82 Ultimately, McGeveran asserts that licensing is not a viable
solution to the problem because of the three factors he lays out above.183
C. PROPOSED SOLUTION

A new structure should exist where small businesses are free to create their
own marks and not be afraid of overly litigious companies. This is not to say
the power imbalance between large and small companies would or even should
be changed, but there are some improvements that should be implemented.
According to McGeverean, "with clearer law and simpler, shorter litigation,

175

Id.

176 1Id
177

Id.

Id at 65 n.80 (citing L.L. Bean, Inc. v. Drake Publishers, Inc., 811 F.2d 26, 33 (1st Cir. 1987)
(discussing the risk that "a corporation could shield itself from criticism by forbidding the use of
its name in commentaries critical of its conduct")).
'79 Id. at 65.
180 Id. at 65 n.81 (citing Jennifer E. Rothman, The Quesdonable Use of Custom in Intellectual Propery,
93 VA. L. REv. 1899, 1914-I5 (2007)).
178

181 Id.
182 Id. at
183

66.

Id.
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both individuals and institutions should be more likely to engage in expressive
uses and more likely to persist in those uses when faced with the prospect of
legal action." 84 At the same time, trademark owners should be less likely to
engage in unreasonably aggressive behavior "or pursue litigation that is clearly
frivolous." 85
There are several options to curtail overly litigious and aggressive
companies. Cease and desist letters are typically the means through which a
company initially threatens small business owners. Currently, trademark owners
face little disincentive to sending these letters and the misuse and overuse of
cease and desist letters has effectively expanded trademark law's doctrine.
Therefore, a starting place would be to create ways to thwart unmeritorious
cease and desist letters. A few suggestions could include punishing coercion,
requiring that copies of cease and desist letters be sent to the Patent and
Trademark Office, or assessing penalties once a certain threshold of letters is
met. Additionally, returning to showing actual economic harm may force larger
companies to have legitimate claims before they begin firing off baseless cease
and desist letters.
One option may simply be greater public scrutiny of behavior by trademark
owners. As discussed earlier, fans of smaller companies or individuals will rally
for their cause by going to the Internet either through a forum or even by
creating a Facebook page. Publicity was used to great effect in the dispute
between North Face, a popular outdoor apparel company, and a college
student.186 The overwhelmingly negative media attention garnered the smaller
company enough support to counteract the considerable resources North Face
had at its disposal.'87 Replicating this outcome in countless other cases where
trademark owners go too far may help deter overly aggressive behavior.
Alternatively, creating a public database of trademark owner cease and desist
letters may bring these often hidden scare tactics to the surface of media
attention. For example, trademark owners could be required to send a copy of
every cease and desist letter to a public repository, which would create a
database of letters that could be monitored and scrutinized. A website called
"Chilling Effects Clearinghouse"' 88 serves an analogous function, but it relies
184

Id

185 Id

186 See North Face Apparel Corp. v. Williams Pharmacy, Inc., No. 9:09CV2029RWS, 2010 WL
546921 (E.D. Mo. Feb. 9, 2010); see also North Face Sues Teenaged South Butt Creator http://
www.npr.org/blogs/thetwo-way/2009/12/north facesuesteenaged-south.html
(last visited
Oct. 2, 2011).
187 Lauren Smiley, South Butt Wins Trademark Battle Over North Face, S.F. WKLY., June 18, 2010,
http://blogs.sfweekly.com/thesnitch/2010/06/southbutt_'winstrademarkbatt.php.
188 Report Receiving a Cease and Desist Notice, CHILLING EFFECTS CLEARINGHOUSE, http://www.
chillingeffects.org/input.cgi (last visited Oct. 2, 2011).
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on recipients voluntarily contributing cease and desist letters rather than forcing
senders to submit them. If this approach is taken, then Congress must
eliminate the argument that a cease and desist letter can be protected under
copyright law, which allows cease and desist senders to threaten an unmerited
copyright infringement (or other) claim if the recipient publicly shares the
letter.189
A second option could involve hiring a central monitor who would call
attention to unreasonable trademark enforcement efforts through some form of
public shaming. Chilling Effects Clearinghouse is a step in this direction, as it
publishes demand letters in a neutral format on a website. While this solution
would generate additional costs, the social benefits of this scrutiny could be
enormous. This sort of availability to the public may incite discussions about
particular trademark holders who continuously act as trademark bullies. Those
discussions could, in turn, bring about changes in the way companies protect
their trademarks.
Another route may be found in the progress made on a proposed federal
anti-SLAPP law, which stands for "Strategic Lawsuit Against Public
Participation."190 The term was coined about three decades ago by two Denver
University professors, George Pring and Penelope Canan.191 Pring and Canan
recognized that lawsuits were discouraging people from participating in vital
government processes. 192 Thus, they advocated for a statute that would curb
these anti-democratic lawsuits.193 While this is a step in the right direction, it is
incomplete because anti-SLAPP protection only applies once a plaintiff has
actually dragged a defendant into court-a subset of the problematic situations
involving cease and desist letters. However, the anti-SLAPP law may apply to
trademark lawsuits, 194 so it could offer a useful expedient in some cases.
A final solution could be to look to international law involving threat actions
in the United Kingdom and other commonwealth countries. In these countries,
threat actions allow a cease and desist letter recipient to sue the sender and
obtain damages including attorney's fees for the suit.195
For example,
Section 21 of the Trade Marks Act of 1994 states that where a trademark owner
189 See, e.g., In r Subpoena Issued Pursuant to the Digital Millennium Copyright Act To:
43SB.Com, LLC, No. MS07-6236-EJL, 2007 WL 4335441 (D. Idaho Dec. 7, 2007).
19 Citizen Participation Act of 2009, H.R. 4364, 111th Cong. (2009).
191 GEORGE W. PRING & PENELOPE CANAN, SLAPPs: GETTING SUED FOR SPEAKING OUT 8-9

(1996).
192 Id.
193 Id. at 188-207.

194 See Mindys Cosmetics, Inc. v. Dakar, 611 F.3d 590 (9th Cit. 2010) (holding that the act of
filing a trademark application with the United States Patent and Trademark Office was protected
by anti-SLAPP statute).
195 See, e.g., Trade Marks Act of 1994, c. 26, § 21 (Eng.).

https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/jipl/vol19/iss1/5

24

Andrzejewski: "Leave Little Guys Alone!": Protecting Small Businesses from Over

2011]

'LEAVE LITTLE GUYS ALONE!"

141

makes groundless threats of infringement proceedings, any person aggrieved
may ask the court for a declaration that the threats are unjustifiable, an
injunction to restrain the continuance of the threats, and damages for any loss
sustained by the threats. 196 The essential components of a threats action are
that a relevant threat has been made, that the person threatened is "a person
aggrieved" and finally, that the threat is unjustified. 97
Borrowing from the threats action legislation in the United Kingdom would
not be entirely seamless. The threats provisions appear to run counter to the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (FRCP) which encourage parties to pursue
alternative dispute resolution before commencing litigation.'98 The FRCP
encourage parties to put their respective cases to each other before litigation
starts, and there is clear tension between the talk-first policy of the FRCP and
the sue-first policy potentially encouraged by the threats legislation. These
solutions would help avoid the current trend of large companies acting as
trademark bullies against smaller companies with fewer resources and forcing
them into submission. While some of the small businesses discussed in this
Note have been successful, an immeasurable majority of businesses yield to the
threats of larger corporations.
IV. CONCLUSION

The Trademark Technical Conforming Act of 2010 comes at an interesting
time. The most important provision of this Act is a call to action for a study to
be conducted concerning the long-term effects of unreasonably aggressive
trademark owners. This study, while a seemingly small step, may put into
motion meaningful reform in the way that large companies communicate with
small companies when they believe their trademark is being infringed.
Certainly, small companies are not always on the right side of the law and,
oftentimes, the large company has a duty to police their trademark by alerting
small and large companies alike that they may be engaged in illegal behavior.
Engaging in some sort of trademark monitoring is necessary for all trademark
owners. Admittedly, it is the larger companies who engage in overly aggressive
litigious behavior that inspired the TTCA's creation.
While the goals of trademark law are to prevent consumer confusion, some
larger companies overstep their bounds and become "bullies" when they harass
smaller, lesser-known companies. This legislation, while a step in the right
direction, merely acknowledges that a problem with these business tactics may

19 Id.E
197

Id.

198 FED. R. Civ.

P. 26(0(2).
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be forming. Further action is necessary to protect both consumers and the
owners of smaller businesses. The proposed solutions aim to suggest possible
methods to improve the position of small business owners in the face of overly
While there are definite costs associated with
aggressive competitors.
implementing each of these solutions, their benefits may prove to outweigh
these costs significantly.
The study required by the 2010 Trademark Technical Conforming
Amendment Act comes after revisions to existing trademark law have been
seemingly ineffective in helping small business owners, given past jurisprudence
governing famous trademarks and dilution claims. While it is still unclear what
results this study will generate, if any, it certainly has reopened a legislative
dialogue that began with the Trademark Dilution Act of 1995. At a minimum,
small business owners should feel some comfort in knowing that Congress is
acknowledging the impact that trademark bullies have in the marketplace. Even
if the study does not come out in favor of small businesses, perhaps they should
hone their lobbying skills while the topic is still up for debate in Congress.
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